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Comment
Prior Misconduct Evidence In Missouri
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the rules and exceptions regarding the admissibility of evidence
of prior misconduct during criminal trials are well established, the theories and
logic underlying the black letter law have apparently eroded to mere words.
State v. Sladek' and State v. Bernard2 were two recent opportunities for the
Missouri Supreme Court to examine the law of uncharged misconduct
evidence. Unfortunately, the majority opinions in these cases did not address
the central problems with this area of evidence but instead, they sidestepped
the issues and created a new unprincipled exception The new exception,
signature modus operandi/corroboration, ignores the central reason that prior
uncharged misconduct evidence is inadmissible: the prejudicial and irrelevant
nature of character evidence when prosecuting a particular crime. Also, the
new exception has been applied differently in the Western District of
Missouri4 than in the Eastern District.' The decisions from the two districts
appear to be applying different legal standards while analyzing the same
words.
Evidence of prior misconduct, when used to demonstrate the defendant's
propensity to commit a crime, is inadmissible.6 Evidence of misconduct that
is not the subject of the present action is admissible to prove the present crime
charged if it establishes 1) motive; 2) intent; 3) absence of mistake or
accident; 4) a common scheme or plan; or 5) identity The generic sound
of the exceptions has led to misinterpretations of the basic principle underlying
the rule.' In an attempt to address this problem, the Missouri Supreme Court
1. 835 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1992).
2. 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1993).
3. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 316-17 (Thomas, J., concurring); Bernard, 849 S.W.2d
at 17.
4. State v. Phillips, 854 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (W.D.) (applying the
exception narrowly).
5. State v. Givens, 851 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (E.D.) (applying the
exception broadly).
6. EDWARD J. IMW'KELREID, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1990);
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (3d ed. 1984); 10 JAMES WM. MOORE &
HELEN I. BENDIX, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 404.21[1] (2d ed. 1993).
7. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901).
8. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315 (Thomas, J., concurring).
1
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created a sixth exception: signature modus operandi/corroboration, This
Comment will discuss the Sladek and Bernard cases, the adoption of the new
exception, and the disparities in the exception's application between the
districts.
II. PAST MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE GENERALLY'0
A 1901 case from New York, People v. Molineux," was the impetus for
the present framework regarding past misconduct evidence.' 2 Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) and Missouri's counterpart to Rule 404(b) use much of the
original Molineux language. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' 3
The applicable section of Missouri's rule has been summarized as follows:
And evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible
for proper more limited purpose, such as proof of motive, intent,
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
14
9. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 17.
10. The issues involving the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence are
covered exhaustively in the premier treatise on such evidence by Professor
Imwinkelreid. See generally IMWINKELREID, supra note 6.
11. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
14. Missouri's rules of evidence, formulated by caselaw, are summarized in
Missouri Evidence Restated (Mo. Bar CLE 1984). For the sake of convenience,
Missouri's parallel to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) will be referred to as Missouri
Rule 404(b), as it is numbered in Missouri Evidence Restated. Missouri's version of
the rule is actually derived from the following case law: State v. Williams, 652
S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1983) (preparation); Rowe v. State, 806 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991) (motive); State v. Vemor, 755 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (intent);
Newman v. State, 751 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (identity); State v. Bebermeyer,
743 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (knowledge); State v. Anderson, 687 S.W.2d
643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (common scheme or plan); State v. Watson, 607 S.W.2d 189
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (absence of mistake or accident). See also IMwiNKLEREID, supra
note 6, §§ 2:27-:28.
[Vol. 58
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The debated issue among scholars and jurisdictions is the effect of the
second sentence in the federal rule and, more precisely, the words "such as."
Does the use of these two words mean that the second sentence only provides
examples of exceptions to the general rule, or is it an exhaustive list?"5
This debate led to the development of the fluctuating uncharged
misconduct doctrine. The fluid nature of this legal area is evidenced by the
number of cases reviewed on appeal regarding this issue.16 According to one
article, the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is the point of
error most frequently asserted on appeal. 7 Uniformity is crucial because the
doctrine is equally applicable to both criminal and civil cases.'
Whether uncharged misconduct evidence will be admitted is primarily a
question of logical and legal relevancy. Usually, the logical relevancy
requirement can be satisfied rather easily.19 Legal relevance, on the other
hand, requires the judge to weigh the probative value of such evidence against
the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the
jury.20 The determination of legal relevance is within the discretion of the
trial court.2 ' The most prevalent danger in using prior misconduct evidence
is the potential for creating jury bias. Such bias manifests itself as an
inference of character or propensity for certain behavior and the conclusion
that the defendant acted in conformity therewith. Other risks are also inherent
in propensity evidence, namely:
[1] that the introduction of evidence of other crimes will mislead
or confuse the jury... [2] that the defendant will be made to
defend, not just against the charges brought, but against all of his
prior, similar behavior which, for whatever reason, was not
prosecuted by the State, and [3] that the jury, in its rush to
punish the defendant for his past acts-which the jury must infer
have gone unpunished-may overlook the fact that the State has
15. IMWINKLEREID, supra note 6, §§ 2:27-:28.
16. State v. Jones, 725 P.2d 312 (Or. 1986). A Westlaw search of key numbers
369, 370, and 371 revealed 11,607 state cases and 1,894 federal cases. Id. at 317.
17. Byron N. Miller, Note, Admissibility of Other Offense Evidence After State v.
Houghton, 25 S.D. L. REV. 166, 167 (1980).
18. CHARLES T. MCCORICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 189-90
(3d ed. 1984).
19. Evidence is "logically relevant" if such evidence tends to make the existence
of any material fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 314.
20. Edgell v. Leighty, 825 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (relevancy). See also
MIssouRi EVIDENCE RESTATED, supra note 14, § 403.
21. State v. Brown, 604 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
1993]
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failed to prove the defendant was guilty of the charges
brought.22
The impact of prior misconduct evidence has been studied by research
groups and individuals.' These groups have found that when evidence of
prior misconduct was admitted, more convictions were returned than in similar
cases in which such evidence was disallowed.24 The evidence stigmatizes the
defendant' and has been deemed "the most prejudicial evidence imaginable
against an accused."2 6
The American justice system is said to punish acts, not people. Case
law has intimated that if the government convicts an individual based upon his
status or character, the individual's Eighth Amendment right to freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment may be violated.28
Some courts have observed that even judges may be swayed by past
misconduct evidence.29 It would be "a feat of psychological wizardry
verg[ing] on the impossible even for berobed judges" to separate the inference
of guilt created by the bad character evidence from relevant evidence."
The unchargedmisconduct doctrine attempts to remove such evidence and
the intermediate inference of bad character from the trier of fact.3 The
danger is that an ultimate conclusion could be drawn from the inference
instead of evidence that directly implicates the defendant in the present crime.
Schematically, the issue looks like this:
Item sought to inference ultimate conclusion
be admitted ---> of character ---> Defendant committed
(prior crime) or propensity crime charged.
22. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 22. (Robertson, C.J., concurring).
23. See IMWINKLEREID, supra note 6, § 1:02.
24. Nicholas J. Kyset, Note, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 535, 544 (1974); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966).
25. James M. Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as
Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offense, 6 ARIz. L. REv. 212, 218 (1965).
26. People v. Smallwood, 722 P.2d 197, 205 (Cal. 1986).
27. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 503-04 (Mich. 1988).
28. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
29. United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banniller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963); United States exrel. Rucker v. Myers, 311 F.2d 311 (3d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 844 (1963); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932); United States v. Kinman, 25 M.J. 99 (C.M.A.
1987).
30. Lesko v. Jeffes, 689 F. Supp. 508, 515 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
31. Vowell v. State, 628 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982).
[Vol. 58
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When prior misconduct is used as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
bad character, leading to the conclusion that the defendant is more likely to
have committed the crime charged, the doctrine is violated per se.32 This
analysis is mandated by the first sentence in Federal Rule 404(b).33 If the
prosecution is to have prior misconduct evidence admitted, it must present the
evidence under a different theory of admissibility. For example, a defendant's
prior rape convictions cannot be used to persuade the factfinder that the
defendant has a propensity for committing rape, but they may be admissible
for other purposes.
This legal theory has support outside of jurisprudence. Psychologists
believe that character is not an accurate indicator of behavior. 4 Instead, they
argue that situational factors are more determinative of human behavior.35
This bar of prior misconduct evidence applies only to evidence that is
offered to show character and actions in accordance therewith. A party may
be able to get prior misconduct evidence admitted under either of two theories.
First, a party may use the contested evidence not to show character, but for
another purpose. 6 For example, if a party is charged with counterfeiting, a
court may find evidence regarding the defendant's prior involvement in
robberies of ink, paper, and printing presses to be particularly relevant
evidence. The other crimes do not merely create an inference of bad
character; they are uniquely related to the counterfeiting charge, i.e., the
defendant possessed the tools necessary to commit the present crime.
Examples of other admissible purposes are listed in the second sentence of
Rule 404(b).37
Second, evidence of the defendant's character can be used to show
conduct when the character is highly probative." This occurs when the
defendant's character is so unique or consistent that its probative value
outweighs the dangers of prejudicial use. 9 For example, imagine a defen-
32. IMWINKLEREiD, supra note 6, § 2:18.
33. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
34. 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 5239 (1978).
35. Robert G. Lawson, Credibility & Character. A Different Look at an
Interminable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REv 758, 778-81 (1975).
36. William Roth, UnderstandingAdmissibility ofPrior BadActs: A Diagrammat-
ic Approach, 9 PEPP. L. REv. 297, 303 (1982).
37. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (listing nine potentially valid uses of misconduct
evidence). Evidence offered to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident may be admissible despite the
exclusionary nature of Rule 404(b).
38. IMWINKLEREID, supra note 6, § 2:38.
39. Id § 2:22.
19931
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dant who has such a rare, abnormal sexual propensity that proof of the
propensity earmarks the defendant as the perpetrator.4" In such a situation,
character serves to identify the defendant as the one who committed the
charged crime.4'
When dealing with past misconduct evidence, there are inclusionary and
exclusionary jurisdictions.42 A jurisdiction that follows an inclusionary
approach admits misconduct evidence as long as the theory of relevancy is not
to show character and actions in accordance therewith.43 In contrast,
exclusionary jurisdictions only admit past misconduct evidence if the theory
of relevancy is one of the enumerated exceptions in the second sentence of
Rule 404(b).44 Missouri is not considered an inclusionary state.45
The exclusionary categories are clear and distinct, but they are only
examples of particularly relevant evidence. Evidence should not be limited
to these five or six exceptions, since the proper question is one of relevan-
cy.46  Relevancy is a facts and circumstances evaluation. One court
characterized the exclusionary approach as creating "pigeon holes" and
ignoring the rule's purpose: an assurance of relevancy.47 Arguably, the
exclusionary approach follows a rule that is too narrow compared to the
broader theory on which it was founded in that the only improper theory of
relevancy is using character to show action in conformity therewith.48
In inclusionary jurisdictions, it is immaterial that the theory of relevancy
does not fit into one of the enumerated categories.49 In these jurisdictions,
the enumerated exceptions are mere examples of particularly relevant uses of
prior misconduct evidence; they are not meant to be an exhaustive list
precluding all other theories of relevancy. This broader theory allows for
the admission of prior misconduct evidence if its relevance is not based solely
upon the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act."
40. Id.
41. Id
42. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315-16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
43. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973).
44. See IMWINKLEREID, supra note 6, §§ 2:27-:28.
45. Id. According to Professor Imwinkelreid, the traditional inclusionary states
are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
46. United States v. Miah, 433 F. Supp. 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
47. Woods, 484 F.2d at 134.
48. IMWINKLEREID, supra note 6, § 2:18.
49. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5239.
50. Id
51. United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1377 (9th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 58
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III. THE IDENTITY EXCEPTION
There are times when two crimes are both committed in such a unique
way or upon such a distinct class of victims that the requirements of relevancy
are met.52 When this occurs, the modus operandi of the crime works as a.
signature of the defendant, much in the same way that a fingerprint identifies
a suspect.53 The threshold issue when applying this exception is whether the
identity of the perpetrator is in question.54 The existence of the criminal
activity is assumed.55 In such a case, the high degree of similarity between
the defendant's modus operandi during prior crimes and the presently charged
crime meets the relevancy requirement.5"
A problem with this type of evidence is the possibility of "copycat"
crimes. If a copycat committed one of the prior crimes attributed to the
defendant, and this evidence is used as evidence in the present trial, the
defendant is prejudiced. The court must recognize that such a problem may
occur.
In order to utilize the identification exception to Rule 404(b), the party
seeking to introduce the evidence must satisfy a two part test.57 The party
must show 1) that both crimes were committed with the same or very similar
modus operandi; and 2) that the methodology is so unique that both crimes
can be attributed to one criminal. 8 Upon showing these two elements, the
party will have demonstrated that it is reasonable to conclude that the same
person committed both of the crimes-an inference of identity. Missouri's
standard is set forth in State v. Koster:5
9
[Mo prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identical
in method... earmark[s] them as the handiwork of the accused.
Here much more is demanded than the mere repeated commis-
sion of crimes of the same class, such as repeated burglaries or
thefts. The device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to
be like a signature.60
52. Regina v. Morris, 54 Cr. App. Rep. 69 (C.A. 1969).
53. Norman Krivosha et al., Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Using
Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REV. 657, 675
(1981).
54. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. Id at 25.
56. Id at 26.
57. IMWnKLEREiD, supra note 6, § 3:10.
58. Id.
59. 684 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
60. Id at 491.
19931
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The first element of the test requires that the crimes be "nearly identi-
cal."6 Usually, courts will look to three factors to see if this requirement is
met. First, were the crimes reasonably close together in time?62 This applies
to uncharged acts that occurred after the charged crime as well as to acts that
occurred prior to the charged crime.63 Second, did the two incidents occur
in roughly the same geographic area?' Third, are the methodologies of the
two crimes unique and distinctive enough to merit admissibility?65 This
factor is the most important of the three.' If there are marked differences
between the charged crime and the past misconduct sought to be introduced,
the court should deny admissibility based upon the identity theory.67 Also,
it is possible that two incidents are geographically and temporally separate, but
the actual methodology is so unique that the court can conclude with
reasonable certainty that the two acts were committed by the same person.6"
The second element of the identity test requires that the methodology be
unique as between the charged crime and the uncharged misconduct.69 This
element is the tool the courts use to sift through potential copycats and generic
crimes.7" Because it is likely that there are optimal techniques with which
to complete certain crimes, numerous criminals may implement the same
methodology. When this situation arises, the court should deny admissibili-
ty.7" Courts should admit the evidence only in distinctive cases that go
beyond general crimes.
61. IMWIN.LEREiD, supra note 6, § 3:11. Thomas Quigley, Note, Admissibility
of Evidence Under Indiana's "Common Scheme or Plan" Exception, 53 IND. L.J. 805,
818 (1978).
62. United States v. Farber, 630 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1980).
63. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 313 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
64. Messenger v. State, 638 S.W.2d 883, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
65. Id.
66. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044-46 (5th Cir. 1977).
67. See United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136-37 (6th Cir. 1979).
68. Jones v. State, 460 So. 2d 1384, 1390 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
69. IMWiNKLEREID, supra note 6, § 3:12.
70. See id. § 3:14.
71. Id § 3:12.
(Vol. 58
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IV. COMMON PLAN OR SCHEME
The common plan or scheme exception is actually a subset of the identity
exception.2 Both theories acknowledge that a crime has been committed;
the sole question with each is, "Who was the perpetrator?" The identity
theory seeks to mark the defendant because of his unique, signature-like
methodology.73 A common plan or scheme theory of admissibility seeks to
mark the defendant because of a logical link between the prior and present
crime.74 The rationale for this exception is that the evidence is relevant to
prove that the defendant is guilty because each of the acts of uncharged prior
misconduct is a step toward committing the charged crime.75 Together, the
activities show the defendant was carrying out a plan to commit the crime.
As stated before, if a defendant is charged with counterfeiting, it is relevant
to show that he had stolen ink that was of the type used in the present
crime.76
In analyzing common plan or scheme cases, the courts have found two
categories: 1) True plans; and 2) spurious plans.77 As the names indicate,
true plans are a sound basis for the admissibility of prior misconduct, but
those considered "spurious" are not.7"
True plan cases involve instances when the defendant considered the
commission of the prior crime and the crime charged as necessary steps in the
execution of an overall objective.79 State v. Kenley80 is demonstrative of
this theory. Kenley involved a crime spree in which each crime led to the
commission of the other." In such cases, the court is presented with
72. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5244.
73. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
74. Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306, 311-12 (D.C. 1987).
75. See infra notes 79-82.
76. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
77. lMWiNKLEREID, supra note 6, § 3:20.
78. See id
79. State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098
(1986).
80. Id.
81. The state introduced evidence that the defendant had a large number of
handguns, purchased ammunition, and practiced shooting the day prior to the charged
crime. Then, on the day of the crime, the defendant robbed a liquor store, threatened
the clerk, and kidnapped a female customer. After leaving the store, Kenley forced
the woman to perform sexual acts. Shortly thereafter, he held up a tavern and shot
and killed the victim when he was slow in obeying the defendant's orders. Then, the
defendant left the tavem with a bartender and another woman. Eventually, the woman
and bartender escaped while Kenley fired shots at them. A little later, he robbed a
motel. That same morning, Kenley entered a Food Mart and demanded a car and a
1993]
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evidence of very distinct activities, yet they are not signatures. The party
seeking admission has to connect the other party with the uncharged acts in
order to gain admission of such acts. 2 Finally, this theory requires a certain
degree of mens rea" The defendant must believe that each crime springs
from the previous one." The term of art useds that "the crimes [must be]
related in fact and in mind.,
85
Sometimes, courts have drifted from the true plan rationale into the
spurious plan rationale without realizing the theoretical problems.86 The use
of the magical word "plan" does not determine the relevancy of the offered
evidence." Spurious plans are not really plans at all, b are attempts to avoid
the strict requirements of the modus operandi/identity theory of admissibili-
ty."8 The spurious theory usually is disguised as a plan to commit a series
of similar crimes.89 This type of evidence is directly proscribed by the first
sentence of Rule 404(b).' When a court allows such evidence, the evidence
might be used to determine the propensity of the individual to commit similar
crimes, which is proving conduct through character. Criminal propensity in
this sense is equivalent to character. When courts are presented with an
argument of relevancy based alternatively on the identity theory or the
common plan or scheme theory, they should closely examine the foundation
of the common plan or scheme theory advanced in order to differentiate true
plans from spurious ones. A party should be required to meet the strict
standards of the identity test without sidestepping them by using the word
"plan."
driver and was arrested as he attempted to leave the parking lot. The court admitted
this evidence as evidence of a common scheme or plan which resulted in the victim's
death. Id. at 80-81.
82. 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 304 (3d ed. 1979).
83. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d at 81.
84. See MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 190.
85. IMwINKEREID, supra note 6, § 3:21.
86. See State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763, 783 (1987) (Heffernan, C.J.,
dissenting).
87. See IMWINKLEREID, supra note 6, §§ 3:21-:23.
88. Note, Admissibility of Similar Crimes: 1901-1951, 18 BROOK. L. REv. 80,
104-05 (1952).
89. See IMWINKLEREiD, supra note 6, § 3:21-:23.
90. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58
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V. STATE V. SLADEK9'
Martin Sladek was charged and convicted of first degree sexual assault
and first degree deviate sexual assault,'2 in the Circuit Court of St. Louis
County, by Judge Robert L. Campbell. 3 Sladek was a practicing dentist in
St. Louis county.94 The victim was an eighteen-year-old co-worker of
Sladek.9" She called him at home complaining of a chipped tooth.'
Though the office was officially closed, Sladek agreed to meet her at the
office later that day.97
The victim helped Sladek prepare for the procedure.98 She was placed
under both nitrous oxide and oxygen sedation." She noticed that the
91. 835 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1992).
92. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 309. The statutes in their pertinent parts read as
follows:
Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.040 (1986)-sexual assault in the first degree-
1. A person commits the crime of sexual assault in the first degree if he has
sexual intercourse with another person to whom he is not married and who
is incapacitated ....
Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.070 (1986)--deviate sexual assault in the first
degree--
1. A person commits the crime of deviate sexual assault in the first degree
if he has deviate sexual intercourse with another person to whom he is not
married and who is incapacitated or who is fourteen or fifteen years old.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.010 (Supp. 1992)-Chapter definitions-As uied in
this chapter:
1) "deviate sexual intercourse" means any sexual act involving the genitals
of one person and the mouth, tongue, hand or anus of another person;
2) "sexual contact" means any touching of the genitals or anus of any
person, or the breast of any female person, or any such touching through
the clothing, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any
person ....
3) "sexual intercourse" means any penetration, however slight, ofthe female
sex organ by the male sex organ, whether or not an emission results ....
93. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 308. The defendant knowingly waived his right to trial
by jury and this waiver was never contested upon appeal. Id.
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concentration of nitrous oxide was unusually strong' ° and claimed it
eventually caused her to lose voluntary control of her arms and legs.'
According to the complaint, Sladek forced himself upon the victim once
she was totally incapacitated."° He allegedly made her perform an involun-
tary act of sodomy and then raped her. 3
The trial court allowed the testimony of four of Sladek's former patients
over the objections of the defense." 4 Each of the four women testified that
Sladek had initiated improper sexual contact during treatment.0 5
L.G. testified that in October 1988, she went to Sladek's office and while
he was working on her teeth, "he repeatedly placed his other hand on her
breast.., he worked his hand underneath the tissue [that she had pulled tight
after he left briefly] and began rubbing her breast with the back of his
hand."' After becoming convinced that Sladek was intentionally fondling
her, she shoved him. Only then did he end the "examination."'
18
Two other witnesses, K.A. and R.C., testified that during examinations,
Sladek repeatedly touched their breasts with his forearm and his free
hand." The fourth witness, S.B., testified that Sladek made sexual advanc-
es toward her."0 She ended the treatment when the pain became too great,
at which time Sladek told her that he would meet her at the office any time
"even if it is 3:00 a.m."' The following day, Sunday, Sladek called S.B.
at her home four times, asking her to return his call." 2
Sladek testified that there was no improper contact between the present
victim and himself on February 11, 1989."1 Also, he stated that any contact
100. Id. The victim stated that the gauges regulating the flow rate of the two
gases read between five and six liters per minute of nitrous oxide and two to three
liters per minute of oxygen. The State produced an expert who testified that two to





104. Id. at 309-13.
105. Id. at 309-10.
106. Id. This incident is alleged to have occurred when the defendant was
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that may have occurred with L.G., K.A., and R.C. was proper."' To refute
the possible negative inferences drawn from S.B.'s testimony, Sladek testified
that it was customary for him to make follow up calls to patients." 5
The defense argued that admitting the four women's testimony was
improper and so prejudicial that it required reversal of the verdict." 6 The
defense asserted that the contested testimonial evidence was neither relevant
to the present crime charged nor was it within any of the common excep-
tions." 7  In Missouri, uncharged crimes are generally inadmissible as
evidence unless they are offered under a specifically enumerated theory of
relevance."' Therefore, according to the defense, the testimony should have
been excluded.1 9
The State, in response to the defendant's objection, argued that the
evidence was proper because it tended to show a common plan or scheme by
Sladek to target his patients for improper sexual purposes. 2 . Both the trial
and appellate courts accepted the State's argument, but the Missouri Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.' The court said, "The
evidence from the other patients... [failed to] have a legitimate tendency to
directly establish the guilt of Sladek."' Thus, the lower court erred in
admitting such evidence.
Judge Thomas concurred in the judgment, but believed that the law
concerning prior misconduct (charged and uncharged) needed to be re-
examined from a logical and realistic point of view." 3 He argued that the
common exceptions to the past misconduct rule had become mere words
separated from their logical underpinnings. 24 He was particularly interested
in the answer to the question, "What is a common scheme or plan?"'" He
advocated a delineation between two similar theories of relevancy.'26 He
would label one as "signature modus operandi/identity" and another as
"signature modus operandi/corroboration. '  An interesting issue in
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 311.
117. Id
118. Id. at 311-13.
119. Id.
120. Id at 311-12.
121. Id. at 309, 313.
122. Id. at 313.
123. Id at 313-18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
124. Id at 314-16.
125. Id at 315.
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Thomas's concurrence is whether these new terms would be helpful or even
proper. It is possible that a corroboration theory of relevancy would require
an expansion of the rules of evidence.
VI. DISCUSSION OF SLADEK
A. The Majority Opinion
As previously stated, the State based its theory of admissibility on the
common scheme or plan exception to the Missouri counterpart to Federal Rule
404(b).'" The prosecuticlaimed stated that "Sladek had a common plan or
scheme to make [his] patients the targets of his misdeeds."'29 Missouri's
standard regarding uncharged crimes evidence was stated in State v.
Reese.' 30 It requires that the commission of the prior uncharged crimes
directly establish the defendant's guilt in the present crime. 131 The court set
out the established exceptions listed in People v. Molineux. The court
unfortunately stated the exceptions rather simply without detailing their
foundational bases.
The majority concluded that, as a matter of law the Reese standard was
not satisfied by showing that the defendant committed a crime of the same
general nature as the one charged.133 The uncharged conduct must have a
legitimate tendency to establish a material fact regarding the present
crime.'34 The test was whether the offered evidence, the testimony of the
former patients, had some legitimate relevancy regarding the present claims
against Sladek 35 "The fact that he (Sladek) may have touched the breasts
of three former patients would have no tendency to prove that he gave the
victim in this case nitrous oxide in sufficient quantity to disable her and
thereafter rape her." ' 36 The court proceeded to explain that the evidence, if
of any value, would tend to subject Sladek to other criminal charges, but not
128. Id. at 311.
129. Id.
130. 274 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1954).
131. Id at 307.
132. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Molineux is, as aforementioned,
the case that led to the development of the exclusionary view among American
jurisdictions. The majority did not even consider or discuss the inclusionary approach,
See supra notes 7, 42-51, 116-19, and infra notes 133-151 and accompanying text.
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necessarily the one presently before the court.'37 "[E]vidence is not
admissible on the theory that if a person will commit one offense he will
commit another.""' The court said that even if Sladek had a common plan
or scheme to take advantage of his patients, it did not see any logical
relevancy between those alleged crimes and the rape in question.'
The majority next examined the holding in State v. Dee.' According
to the Supreme Court of Missouri, it was upon this case that the appellate
court upheld Sladek's conviction.' Dee involved a male employee of the
Division of Family Services (DFS). 42 He was convicted of forcibly raping
the mother of one of his clients.' In Dee, the State was allowed to
introduce evidence that other women who reported to Dee at DFS were also
subjected to various aggressive sexual advances.'" The court held that Dee
had a common plan or scheme to use his position of power to manipulate
these women and to obtain sexual gratification.'45
The court distinguished Dee from the present case solely because Dee
was in a position of power, while Sladek's patients were in his presence
voluntarily.'46 "Thus, Dee and this case are not comparable." 47 This
distinction is weak, at best.'48
The final issue the majority addressed concerned the possible remedy for
the admission of such improper evidence. Was a reversal to be granted in a
court-tried case?'49 Even though judges are allowed more discretion in cases
tried without juries, the court felt it was evident, considering the statements




140. 752 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
141. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 312.
142. Dee, 752 S.W.2d at 944.
143. Id. at 943. The child was under the concern of the DFS and thus the mother
was somewhat powerless with respect to Dee. Id. at 946-48.
144. Id
145. Id. at 947-48.
146. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 313.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
149. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 308.
150. The trial judge in Sladek stated that he would not have convicted him but
for the testimony of the four alleged former victims. The judge felt that the testimony
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B. Judge Thomas's Concurrence
Judge Thomas said in his first paragraph that he was writing separately
in an attempt to clarify the common scheme or plan exception., 2 In doing
so, Judge Thomas stated his hope that future decisions would be more
consistent.' He began by setting forth the general rule that "bad guy
evidence" is not admissible.5
Next, Judge Thomas discussed the relationship between logical relevancy
and legal relevancy and how the latter may mandate the exclusion of logically
relevant evidence when the dangers of the Missouri counterpart to Rule 403
are present.' He then reiterated the discretionary role of the judge in such
a balancing test.'56 Even though prior misconduct evidence is probative and
relevant to guilt, Judge Thomas stated strongly that the prejudicial nature of
such evidence must be considered because of its practical effects upon the
factfmder.
57
After dismissing the preliminary evidentiary issues, Judge Thomas delved
into the substance of his concurrence: the titles of the exceptions give rise to
confusion because of their "generic sound."'5 Words such as "common
scheme," "plan" and "identity" have become legal buzzwords that attorneys
utilize irrespective of the legal foundation upon which they were originally
recognized. 59
Judge Thomas addressed the defendant's argument that the common
scheme or plan exception applied only in "single plan" cases. 60 Citing State
v. Kenley,'' Sladek argued that in order for this exception to apply, the
State was required to show that he contemplated the commission of the rape
and the four touchings prior to committing any of them. 62
Kenley involved a crime spree that encompassed robbery, rape, kidnap-
ping, and murder. 63 The Kenley court admitted evidence of the prior
crimes because they "evince[d] a common scheme or plan pointing to
152. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 313-14 (Thomas, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 314.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
156. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 314 (Thomas, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 315.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 693 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986).
162. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315.
163. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58
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defendant as the participant in the robbery that resulted in [the victim's]
death."' Judge Thomas said that this type of plan case could be character-
ized as "part of the same transaction (the charged crime)." 6' After
acknowledging this as a "common scheme or plan," Judge Thomas concluded
that although the testimony of the four patients in the present case did not fall
into this exception, it may have fallen within the identity exception."6
His discussion of the identity exception focused primarily upon the
signature modus operandi approach.' Judge Thomas discussed Jones v.
State'68 as the classic example of an identity case. Jones involved two
nearly identical robberies in Tennessee and Alabama. 69 In both of the
incidents, the victims were taken by a man identified as the defendant to a
barn where they were subsequently robbed at gunpoint by an individual
wearing a Halloween mask, a long black wig, and wielding a long barreled
pistol.' The defendant offered an alibi defense and denied any involve-
ment in either of the incidents.'' The Alabama court upheld the admissibil-
ity of the Tennessee incident and stated the identity exception as follows:
Under the identity exception to the general exclusionary rule
prohibiting the admission of other or collateral crimes as
substantive evidence of the guilt of the accused, the other crime
is not relevant to prove identity unless both that and the now-
charged crime are "signature crimes" having the accused's mark
and the peculiarly distinctive modus operandi so that they may
be said to be the work of the same person. 72
This approach to the identity exception requires that the modus operandi be
unique and so distinctive that a reasonable factf'mder would feel compelled to
find that both acts were committed by the same person. 73 The language
used by Missouri courts is that the modus of the crime be unique, such that
164. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315 (quoting State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79, 82
(Mo. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986)).
165. Id.
166. Id
167. Id at 316.
168. 460 So. 2d 1384 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
169. Id. at 1386.
170. Id. at 1390.
171. Id
172. Id.
173. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 316 (Thomas, J., concurring).
19931
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it becomes a constructive signature of one individual. 74 Judge Thomas
called this application the "signature modus operandi/identity" exception. 75
After explaining this theory of relevancy, Judge Thomas argued for a
spin-off called "signature modus operandi/corroboration.I 76 He claimed that
the holding in Dee was a situation in which corroboration would be the proper
exception to apply. 177 The typical identity theory was not applicable in Dee
because the identity of Dee was not a contested issue. 78 Rather, the issue
was whether the alleged activity occurred at all. 79
In Dee, the appellate court had to decide whether the testimony of the
other women was relevant under any theory. 8 The Missouri Court of
Appeals, Eastern District, upheld the admission of the testimony based upon
a common scheme or plan.' The Dee court characterized the scheme as
one in which the defendant utilized his position to manipulate women.' 2
The facts of the case did not point to the existence of a single plan like the
one in Kenley." It was not argued that Dee contemplated the sexual
advances on all of the victims before acting.' Judge Thomas appeared to
recognize this deficiency in the Dee court's reasoning and therefore, without
rejecting the holding of Dee, he presented an alternative legal theory,
corroboration, to justify the admission of the contested evidence.' 8
In support of corroboration, Judge Thomas stated that when the probative
value of the modus operandi overcomes the possible prejudice in identity
cases, such evidence "is probably equally strong in a case where it is offered
to corroborate a victim's complaint.' 86
After making these bold assertions, Judge Thomas addressed the potential
dangers of his suggested approach. 87 An initial problem with both of the
modus operandi exceptions is that the degree of similarity required may
174. State v. Koster, 684 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
175. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 316 (Thomas, J., concurring).
176. Id.





182. Dee, 752 S.W.2d at 947.
183. Cf State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098
(1986).
184. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315; see Dee, 752 S.W.2d at 947.
185. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317 (Thomas, J., concurring).
186. Id,
187. Id, at 312.
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become so relaxed over time that the exception swallows the rule.' This
problem, inherent in exceptions, is routinely addressed by the judiciary in
other contexts and is thus assumed manageable. "Although we have called
this exception corroboration, it really involves reasoning from the signature
modus operandi based upon the propensity of the defendant to commit this
type of crime to the conclusion that the defendant committed the crime
charged."'8 9 Judge Thomas acknowledged the theoretical problem presented
by this reasoning: allowing one party to present evidence that leads the
factfinder to reason through the other party's character to reach a verdict."9
Judge Thomas offered five factors to offset the prejudicial nature of the
evidence. These factors are as follows: 1) the modus operandi must be
unique; 2) the modus operandi must be unusual; 3) the modus operandi
possesses distinguishing characteristics unique to the individual; 4) the
existence of repeated similar occurrences; and 5) temporal proximity between
the charged crime and the offered evidence. 9' All of these factors are to
be considered in making a final judgment of relevancy."
Finally, Judge Thomas offered an alternate holding based on the
application of his approach towards corroboration. 93 Even though the four
prior incidents involved illegal sexual activities in Sladek's office, they
nonetheless were neither similar enough to the crime charged nor unique
enough for Judge Thomas to hold that the previous patients' testimony was
admissible under his corroboration approach." The methodology in the
other four instances did not involve nitrous oxide as alleged in the present
charge.'95 Judge Thomas stated that if nitrous oxide had been used "[the
prior acts] would likely qualify for admission under the ... corroboration
exception."'96 The crimes alleged in the former patients' testimony did not
satisfy the common plan or scheme exception because all of the incidents were
188. Id. at 315.
189. Id. at 317.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 316-317. According to Thomas, "unusual" in this context means
something beyond unique. He would only admit evidence under this corroboration
approach if it were so bizarre that it would earmark the party to such an extent that
its probative value would overcome the legal relevancy problem of reasoning through
character. Id. at 317.
192. Id. at 317.
193. Id. at 317-18.
194. Id.
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not part of a single plan."9 Nor did they qualify as signature crimes, as
they were not significantly similar to the crime charged. 98
VII. STATE V. BERNARD199
Larry Bernard was charged and convicted of sexual abuse in the first
degree2' and attempted forcible sodomy.20' He was convicted by a jury
in the Circuit Court of Clinton County before Judge Stephen K. Griffin.2°
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the verdict, but the
Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.03
The alleged victim was a fourteen-year-old male who was a member of
the defendant's youth group at the time of the incident in October of
1988.2' 4 Bernard tricked the victim into spending a night in a motel with
him.5 The defendant convinced the victim to play strip rummy with
him.2'6 At the conclusion of the game, both the defendant and the young
male were clothed in only their underwear and subsequently crawled into a
single bed to spend the night.27  After the victim fell asleep, Bernard
proceeded to rub the victim's back, arm, and chest.28 Also, the defendant
fondled the boy's genitals, and Bernard placed his erect penis against the
victim's genitals.2" The victim repeatedly tried to push Bernard away, but
Bernard forced the victim into submission.10 While the victim was in his
underwear, Bernard took a photo of him.2 ' Upon leaving the motel, the
defendant encouraged the victim to run or walk around his car either nude or
in his underwear.1 2 The young male victim refused.213
197. Id
198. Id.
199. 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1993).
200. Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.100 (1986).
201. Id. § 566.060.
202. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 10.
203. Id.
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Following his conviction,2"4 Bernard alleged error necessitating reversal
based upon the admission of testimony by four former youth group mem-
bers.2" 5 Andrew, Bob, Charles, and Don testified at length concerning
alleged uncharged acts of sexual abuse by Bernard that occurred during 1977-
78.2"6 All four former members of the defendant's youth groups recounted
stories of sexual abuse at sleepovers either at the church or at Bernard's house
and weird "initiation" rituals involving sexual acts.2" 7 Such acts included the
licking of ice cream toppings off of other boys' genitals, taking photographs
of boys naked, masturbating in front of the defendant, and performing the
elephant walk.2"8 Also, the witnesses testified that Bernard, at various times,
had touched or rubbed their genitals." 9 All four witnesses stated that during
their membership in the defendant's youth groups they were forced to run or
jog naked in front of a slowmoving car driven by Bernard." °
Bernard, as appellant, challenged the admission of this testimony as
irrelevant and prejudicial."' The Missouri Supreme Court held that all the
testimony except the testimony regarding the naked boys and the slow moving
cars was inadmissable under the newly adopted signature modus operan-
di/corroboration exception.' The admission of the other evidence was so
prejudicial that a new trial had to be ordered.'m
VIII. DISCUssION OF BERNARD
A. The Majority Opinion
The importance of the Bernard decision is that Missouri adopted the
signature modus operandi/corroboration exception that Judge Thomas argued
for in his concurrence in Sladek. 4 In a concurrence, however, Judge
Thomas contended that the corroboration approach discussed in Sladek should
not be adopted and Chief Judge Robertson's concurring opinion argued
strenuously against the adoption of this approach.'
214. Id.
215. Id. at 12-13.
216. Id at 13, 17-19.
217. Id. at 17-19.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 18.
221. Id. at 19.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 20.
224. Id. at 17.
225. Id. at 21-24 (Robertson, C.J., concurring); id at 24-27 (Thomas, J.,
1993]
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The majority discussed the prior law of uncharged sexual misconduct in
Missouri, particularly as it related to offenses against children. 6 The court
was disturbed by the "depraved sexual instincts" exception that was created
two years earlier in State v. Lachterman.17  "A blanket rule allowing
evidence of any recent misconduct by the defendant with a child of the same
sex as the victim may encourage-the jury to convict the defendant because of
his propensity.""8  They thought that the Lachterman exception was too
broad but that the signature modus operandi/corroboration exception would
serve the same purpose (admission of prior sexual misconduct) with less
prejudicial effect upon defendants. 9
Without much explanation beyond the references in Judge Thomas's
concurrence in Sladek, Missouri created a new exception to the general bar of
prior misconduct evidence.20  The new exception to the unchanged
misconduct evidence rule adopted by the majority is as follows: "Evidence
of prior sexual misconduct that corroborates the testimony of the victim [and
that is] nearly identical to the charged crime and so unusual and distinctive as
to be a signature of the defendant's modus operandi" is admissible."' After
announcing the new test, the majority applied it to the facts of the Bernard
case. 
2
The testimony of the four former youth group members was barred
except for references to the initiation activities involving naked boys running
around a car driven by the defendant. 3 All of the testimony relating to
nude photographs, masturbation, fondling, and the sleepovers was barred
because it was not deemed unusual or distinctive enough to meet the
requirements of the new exception. 4 This later testimony is commonplace
in sexual abuse cases and did not "earmark" the defendant.23'
concurring).
226. Id. at 13-19.
227. 812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
228. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 16.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 17 (citing Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
231. Id
232. Id at 17-20.
233. Id at 19-20.
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B. Chief Judge Robertson's Concurrence
Chief Judge Robertson concurred in remanding the case for a new
trial, 6 but explicitly disagreed with the adoption of the signature modus
operandi/corroboration exception.27  He outwardly acknowledged the
outrage that sexual crimes create in society, but advised that society should not
let its anger distort its judgment. 8 According to the chief judge, the new
exception placed the defendant's right to a fair trial in peril."'
Chief Judge Robertson believed that any value that signature modus
operandi/corroboration evidence has is heavily outweighed by its dangers.240
The dangers he enumerated bear repeating. The risks include: 1) that
misconduct evidence will mislead or confuse the jury; 2) that the jury will
give undue weight to the propensity evidence ("once a criminal always a
criminal"); 3) that the defendant will have to defend against misconduct not
within the pleadings; and 4) that the jury, under a sense of justice, may punish
the defendant for prior crimes with which the defendant was never
charged.
241
Chief Judge Robertson stated that the relevance of the new exception
went specifically against the underlying principle of the rule.242 It allows
a party to introduce evidence that does nothing more than illuminate the
defendant's propensity to commit similar crimes and thus permit the jury to
infer that the defendant committed the present crime.243
Chief Judge Robertson also determined that, despite the "fundamental
tenets" of the rule against prior crimes evidence, the evidence admitted in
Bernard should have been rejected.2' First, Chief Judge Robertson believed
that the testimony of the four men had no legitimate tendency to directly
establish Bernard's guilt, but merely implied a propensity for sexual
misconduct.245 Second, the evidence admitted by the majority was not
relevant to a material issue, but purely collateral; Bernard was not charged
with having boys dance naked around a car but rather, with sexual assault and
236. Id. at 21 (Robertson, C.J., concurring). See also supra note 225 and
accompanying text.
237. Id. at 21.
238. Id
239. Id
240. Id at 22.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 22-23.





Kuhlman: Kuhlman: Prior Misconduct Evidence
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
ASSOURI LAW REVIEW
attempted forcible sodomy.246 Lastly, the type of evidence admitted under
the new exception had nothing to do with corroborating the victim's story.247
Corroborating evidence is useful merely to confirm the evidence of another
fact.248 An example of proper corroboration evidence would include
testimony by an eyewitness to the crime who states that the crime actually
occurred as the victim stated. The testimony of the four men did not
corroborate the victim's story because they testified regarding other events and
not the incident for which the defendant was convicted.249 Chief Judge
Robertson believed that this testimony only served as indirect corroboration
of the victim's story and was thus improper." 0
The chief judge went on to unveil the real theory underlying the
relevancy of signature modus operandi/corroboration evidence. This new
exception permits the prosecution to convince the jury that the defendant has
a propensity for the type of crime charged and is thus more likely to have
committed it." Chief Judge Robertson reminded the majority that the
legislature had not sought to make propensity to commit a crime illegal.252
He also dismissed the majority's concern that the private nature of sexual
crimes necessitated the new exception because the evidence in such cases is
hard to obtain.2"3 The legislature would have considered these evidentiary
difficulties in sexual abuse cases and the judiciary should not seek to punish
defendants on grounds not authorized by the legislature." 4 It is important
to note that the majority did not restrict the signature modus
operandi/corroboration exception to sexual crimes only, even though the
unique evidentiary problems associated with such crimes provided the
justification for the exception's adoption.2"
C. Judge Thomas's Concurrence
Judge Elwood Thomas concurred in the majority's order for a new trial
but disagreed with the adoption of the new signature modus
operandi/corroboration exception." 6 Judge Thomas agreed with the majority
246. Id
247. Id.
248. People v. St. Andrew, 161 Cal. Rptr. 634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).






255. See generally Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 10-21.
256. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 24-25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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in their abolition of both the liberal trend of admission of prior crime evidence
under the common plan or scheme exception and the Lachterman special
exception for the sexual abuse of children. 7 He candidly admitted that his
concurrence in Sladek, which originally suggested the new exception, was
improper and should not be adopted when the issue in the case is whether a
crime occurred at all."
As Judge Thomas reanalyzed the propriety of a signature modus
operandi/corroboration exception, he focused on the difference between cases
in which the issue was whether the crime occurred at all, and cases in which
the issue was whether the defendant committed the crime.5 9 In the latter
kind of case, it is normally conceded that the crime occurred, but the
defendant denies being the perpetrator. The distinction between these two
types of cases mandates different approaches.
When the identity of the perpetrator is at issue, the unique and distinctive
nature of the prior crimes is relevant because it serves the same function as a
fingerprint.260 Judge Thomas cited to the Jones case as an example of the
proper use of past crimes evidence.26" ' In Jones, it was uncontested that the
robbery occurred, so the jury did not have to rely upon the uncharged crime
evidence to prove that a crime occurred.262 By contrast, Bernard sought a
very different use of the past crime evidence. The prosecution sought to
prove that the defendant committed the charged crime because he may have
had young men walk around a car naked ten years ago.263 Judge Thomas
believed the presumption of free will in criminal cases bars the admission of
the prior crime evidence for this purpose." What Bernard may have
chosen to do ten years ago has "very little bearing on what choice he may or
may not have made with the victim."2 "5 Judge Thomas even opined that the
distinctive nature of the prior conduct that makes the evidence relevant in
identity cases actually detracts from its relevance in corroboration cases.26
When an activity is extremely odd, it is unlikely that it will be repeated.
Thus, the only value the contested evidence in Bernard possessed was its
ability to demonstrate a propensity on the part of the defendant to commit
257. Id at 25.
258. Id at 25-27.
259. Id. at 25-26.
260. Id. at 26.
261. Id at 24; see also Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 315-16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
262. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 27 (Thomas, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 27.
264. Id, at 26-27.
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deviant sexual acts. Pure propensity evidence is barred entirely by the
Missouri rules of evidence.267
Judge Thomas retracted his suggestion in Sladek for the new exception
and requested that the court apply the traditional exceptions to the general bar
to prior crimes evidence.2 68  He was admirably frank in admitting his
mistake.
IX. COMMENT
A. District Split in Bernard's Application
Now that Bernard is the law in Missouri, the Western and Eastern
District Courts of Appeals have attempted to apply it.269 Not surprisingly,
these two districts have applied the new exception in greatly different ways.
The Eastern District has been more apt to admit prior misconduct evidence
than the Western District. Even though the test that the courts are applying
is the same, the results are inconsistent.
Two demonstrative Eastern District cases are State v. Givens2 70 and
State v. Coleman." The defendant in Givens was convicted of sodomy and
first degree sexual assault.272 The victim, T.K.G., was the defendant's
eleven year-old-daughter. 3 She slept in a room with her two sisters and
her one stepsister. 4
The contested evidence on appeal concerned the propriety of the
admission of testimony of uncharged sexual misconduct by the defendant.275
The victim's sister and stepsister testified that they had been subjected to
similar sexual assaults by the defendant. 76 The Givens court cited to the
following language from Bernard before applying the facts of the present case
to the exception's elements:
267. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
268. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 27 (Thomas, J., concurring).
269. See State v. Thomas, 857 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (W.D.); State
v. Coleman, 857 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (E.D.); State v. Bird, 854 S.W.2d
807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (W.D.); State v. Phillips, 854 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (W.D.); State v. Givens, 851 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (E.D.).
270. 851 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
271. 857 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
272. State v. Givens, 851 S.W.2d 754, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
273. Id. at 757.
274. Id
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For corroboration evidence to be of sufficiently increased
probative value so as to outweigh its prejudicial effect, the
evidence must be more than merely similar in nature to the
sexual assault for which the defendant is charged... [it] should
be nearly identical to the charged crime and so unusual and
distinctive as to be a signature of the defendant's modus
operandi.277
The court held that the testimony of the sisters and the stepsister met the
elements of the signature modus operandi/corroboration exception.2 8
According to the Eastern District Court of Appeals, the testimonial evidence
of the sisters was similar and distinctive enough. 9
The court listed five threads of commonality between all of the girls'
testimony that led to the satisfaction of the exception's requirements. The
defendant would
(1) come into his daughters' bedroom at night; (2) select one of
them and pull them down to the foot of the bed or onto the
floor; (3) fondle and sexually molest them in the presence of the
other girls; (4) physically abuse them if they resisted his efforts;
and (5) threaten to kill them and their mother if they told anyone
what he was doing.280
These common elements of the girls' testimony supposedly earmarked the
defendant and corroborated the victim's testimony.8
It appears that the facts the Givens court listed as corroborative of the
defendant's activities do not identify behavior that is so distinctive and unique
that only one person could have committed the acts. The young girls tell
stories that are very similar, but they do not possess the requisite uniqueness
that the naked boys moving around the car in Bernard did. As terrible and
revolting the sexual abuse in this case is, there is nothing that distinguishes
these sexual assaults from typical sexual assaults of minors.
In State v. Coleman,282 the defendant was convicted for having deviate
sexual intercourse with a six year old.283 The trial court admitted testimony
by two other alleged victims who claimed to have been similarly molested ten
277. Id. at 762 (citing Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317-18 (Thomas, J., concurring))
(alteration in original).
278. Id.
279. Id at 762-63.
280. Id at 763.
281. Id.
282. 857 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
283. Id at 364.
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years earlier.2 The court held that the other two victims' testimony was
admissible under the new exception because there was a unique manner in
which the defendant abused all three children.285 According to the evidence,
the defendant would lubricate his hands with either saliva or water before he
abused the young girls.286 There was no other distinctive factor. The other
particulars relating to the abuse were typical in sexual abuse of minors
cases.
287
Though sexual abuse is one of the most morally repulsive crimes in
society, justice should not be lost in a modem day witch hunt. The alleged
activity in Coleman was not so unusual to sexual abuse cases to justify
admission of the other girls' testimony. Lubrication is not such a rare activity
that only one abuser would ever utilize that method to achieve his own
gratification.
The Western District is much more hesitant to allow prior misconduct
evidence to be admitted under the signature modus operandi/corroboration
exception. 8 A brief discussion of three cases from that district will
illuminate the disparity in application of the new exception between the
districts. In each of these cases, the trial court held that the prior misconduct
evidence was admissible, but the appellate court reversed and remanded
because of Bernard.289
In State v. Bird,' the defendant was convicted of sodomizing two
young males on his property.29' The contested testimony was that of
another boy who stated that he had been molested by Bird in a similar
manner.' The two victims testified that Bird had led them into his barn
or shed and showed them pornographic pictures of men and women engaging
in intercourse.21 After showing the young boys the pornography, Bird
allegedly performed fellatio upon each of the victims.2 4
284. Id
285. Id at 365.
286. Id at 364-65.
287. Id at 365. Common factors included fondling of the young girls' vaginal
areas and rubbing the defendant's penis on or near the victims' bodies. Id.
288. See generally State v. Thomas, 857 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Bird, 854 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Phillips, 854 S.W.2d 803 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993).
289. See supra notes 230-31.
290. 854 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
291. Id
292. Id at 807-08.
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The contested testimony of the third boy stated that during the same
summer in which the aforementioned acts occurred, he went to play with
Bird's son and ended up looking at pornographic magazines with Bird.295
Bird then supposedly pulled down the boy's pants and began rubbing his
penis.2"
Bird's attorney argued that the evidence unfairly attemptedto demonstrate
Bird's bad character and propensity for sexually molesting young boys on his
farm.2 97  The trial court admitted the third boy's testimony under the
Lachterman sexual deviance exception.29 When the case reached the
appellate level, Bernard was the law.299
The Western District Court of Appeals stated that the new exception
under Bernard had three elements: 1) The uncharged acts must be nearly
identical to the charged act; 2) the conduct must be unusual and distinctive;
and 3) the charged and uncharged conduct should be minimally remote in
time.3" Bird was the first case to consider remoteness as a separate element
of the new exception. The appellate court held that Bird's alleged prior
conduct was not distinctive or unusual enough to merit admission under
Bernard."'
State v. Phillips,3" a case similar to Bird, was decided on the same
day."3 The victims in Phillips were young girls."°  Leroy Phillips was
convicted of sexually assaulting his stepgranddaughter, C.M. 05 One issue
on appeal was whether the trial court properly admitted evidence from another
young girl who stated that Phillips had sexually assaulted her a few years
before.3"
The conduct that was the subject matter of the charge occurred in
Phillips's house while his stepgranddaughter was visiting." 7 Supposedly,
Phillips molested C.M. on various beds in his house over a period of three
295. Id at 807-08.
296. Id. at 808.
297. Id
298. Id.
299. Id. at 809.
300. Id
301. Id. at 810.
302. 854 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
303. Both cases were decided on April 20, 1993, but were before different
appellate panels.
304. Phillips, 854 S.W.2d at 803.
305. Id
306. Id at 803-04.
307. Id at 804.
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years." 8 The abuse involved the touching and fondling of C.M.'s vagi-
na. 30
9
The other girl, J.G., testified that Phillips had sexually molested her on
three occasions approximately three years earlier. 0 The three incidents
allegedly occurred while Phillips and J.G. were fishing, in his truck, and at the
barber shop.31' J.G. said that Phillips had touched her vagina in the first
two instances and attempted to touch her on the third.'
The court held that nothing testified to by either C.M. (regarding only the
uncharged conduct which allegedly occurred during the two years prior to the
charged conduct) or J.G. evinced conduct that was so unusual or distinctive
to warrant admission under Bernard.13 The judgment of conviction was
reversed and remanded because the admission of the uncharged sexual
misconduct constituted prejudicial error.3'4
In State v. Thomas,3'5 the defendant was convicted of rape, but the jury
was allowed to hear evidence that he had made a sexual advance toward
another woman not involved in the charged incident.3 6 The victim (T.P.),
the defendant, and the other woman (T.C.) were all students at the University
of Missouri-Columbia at the time of the incident.' Thomas knew both of
the women prior to the incident.318
The rape occurred in T.P.'s apartment on June 20, 1991.3' Before the
rape, Thomas looked in each room and switched the lights on and off.320
Thomas made statements during the actual rape referring to his love for T.P.
and how he was lonely and did not want her to stay with her boyfriend. 2'
T.C. testified that Thomas had previously forced himself upon her in her
apartment.312 She described the event in a fashion similar lo T.P.'s descrip-






313. Id at 807.
314. Id.
315. 857 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
316. Id at 538.
317. Id. at 538-39.
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he arrived at her apartment, flipped the lights on and off, and then began
"hugging her and touching her all over her body."324 Also, Thomas men-
tioned her boyfriend while she was struggling against him.325
The defense argued that the admission of T.C.'s testimony was prejudicial
error.326  The trial court admitted T.C.'s testimony because it "had a
legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant's guilt of the crime
charged."327 The trial court believed that Thomas's conduct amounted to a
unique and special modus operandi method of sexual assault.32
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court.329 They concluded
that the acts of flipping on and off the lights, checking all the rooms in both
apartments, mentioning the victims' boyfriends, and mentioning loneliness
were not such unique and distinctive factors to meet the elements of the
Bernard exception.330  "The actions noted are common, not unusual.
Similarities between the incidents is [sic] not sufficient. 331
One can simply look to the results reached by the two districts and
conclude that they are in actuality applying different tests. The Eastern
District is much more liberal in admitting prior misconduct evidence.332 It
appears that the Eastern District has forgotten the second element of the new
exception test: unusual and distinctive conduct. All that appears to matter to
the Eastern District is that the charged conduct occurred in a similar fashion
as the uncharged misconduct. This is the danger that Judge Thomas warned
of in his Sladek concurrence.3 33 If the Eastern District Court of Appeals'
decisions are any indication of the future use of the Bernard exception, it is
very possible for the exception to swallow the entire rule in semantic
quicksand. Propensity evidence validated with a rule such as the one adopted
in Bernard can only have the effect of robbing defendants of their right to be
tried for their actions and not their character.
The Western District, which abides more by the letter of the exception
as originally penned by Judge Thomas, refuses much of the same evidence









332. See generally supra notes 270-87 and accompanying text discussing the two
Eastern District cases.
333. See supra notes 182-190 and accompanying text.
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evidenced by the holdings of Bird (Western District denying admission)33
and Coleman (Eastern District granting admission). 35
In Bird, the Western District denied admission of uncharged misconduct
even though the evidence of similarity between the boys' abusive episodes
contained unique circumstances. 3 6 All the boys were in some kind of outer
building when the abuse occurred.337 Also, the abuse was preceded by a
viewing of pornographic material with the abuser.338 The actual abuse,
fondling and fellatio, is not unique or particularly distinctive to the sexual
abuse of young males and so the evidence of such uncharged misconduct was
disallowed. 39 In Coleman, the similarities in the circumstances surrounding
the abuse of the girls were less distinctive than those in Bird. Lubrication by
the defendant in the sexual abuse of young girls is commonplace. It is not a
distinctive factor that specifically identified Phillip Coleman from other sexual
abusers. One is left feeling that if the Coleman court had handled the Bird,
case all the evidence that was denied in Bird would have been admitted. A
close examination of Bernard and the evidence which was admitted (testimony
concerning naked boys jogging around a slow moving car) and that which was
denied (testimony as to naked photographs, masturbation, fondling and sleep
overs) illuminates how the Coleman case was decided wrongly. The admitted
evidence in Bernard identifies Bernard and separates him from other
pedophiles. This problem with consistency among the Eastern and Western
Districts' application of the new exception is a manifestation of the underlying
disease. Propensity evidence, admissible because of Bernard, is inherently
prejudicial and dangerous to the legitimacy of Missouri's judicial system. It
is a quagmire of uncertainty and unfairness that this state should avoid.
B. Discussion of Sladek and Bernard
1. The Majority's Opinion in Sladek
The Sladek majority's analysis of whether prior misconduct evidence is
admissible revolved around whether "such proof has a legitimate tendency to
directly establish the defendant's guilt of the charge for which he is on
trial."34 This appears to be a stricter standard of logical relevancy than that
which is usually required. Evidence that an individual committed a similar
334. Bird, 854 S.W.2d at 809.
335. Coleman, 857 S.W.2d at 365-66.
336. Bird, 854 S.W.2d at 809.
337. Id
338. Id. at 807-08.
339. Id.
340. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 311.
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offense does not directly establish the defendant's guilt in the instant case.341
Propensity as such may be logically relevant but is barred by protections of
legal relevancy (i.e., avoidance of prejudice). 42
The majority does not note this difference between logical and legal
relevancy in its analysis. This omission only creates confusion as to the
foundation of their conclusion. If the court expressly recognizes the factors
in Missouri's version of Rule 403, then trial judges will have more guidance
when deciding similar issues in the future.
In only one sentence did the majority mention the dangers of the
contested evidence. They dismissed the potential dangers, saying "evidence
of other crimes could have a dangerous and misleading probative force
... .043 This nonchalant treatment of the potential harm to defendants is
worrisome. What makes the former patients' testimony dangerous? Maybe
the majority correctly reasoned that such evidence could only be relevant if
Sladek's propensity to commit similar crimes logically leads to the conclusion
that he committed the present crime. Upon this realization of the underlying
theory of relevancy, the court held that Missouri's counterpart to Federal Rule
404(b) barred that conclusion.3
The most troubling part of the majority's decision is the way it interjects
its own views regarding what evidence established (or in this case did not
establish) a legitimate tendency to prove the crime charged. The trial judge
was present when the evidence was originally offered and was inherently
better able to decide whether the evidence was relevant.
This haphazard wielding of discretion is most evident in the majority's
attempt to distinguish Dee from the instant case.345 This court based its
distinction upon Sladek's lack of authority over his patients in the same
manner that Dee had over the mothers of his clients.3" A DFS employee
is working within a government agency with regulatory procedures to handle
complaints, while Sladek was working alone in his office under the guise of
professional ethics. The court said that Sladek's patients were free to leave
voluntarily and thus what allegedly occurred was less likely to be probative
than what was alleged in Dee. The deficiency in this arbitrary distinction is
evident in this quote from the majority: "[O]ne of the patients did leave and
refused to go back to see Sladek. Thus, Dee and this case are not compara-
ble." '47 Sladek could have easily been seen as an authority figure exercising
341. Id. at 312.
342. See supra notes 155-57.
343. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 311.
344. Id. at 312.
345. Id at 312-13.
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control over both the present victim (by virtue of her status as employee) and
the contested witnesses (as patients). It appears that if a patient refused to
come back, this fact would be at least as probative as the evidence admitted
in Dee. The majority's dismissal of Dee was cursory and unsatisfactory.
Even though the court in Dee said that it based its verdict on the common
plan or scheme exception, the facts demonstrate that the verdict rested upon
a spurious plan.348 Spurious plans are used to show that the defendant
committed a series of similar crimes that do not amount to a true plan or an
identity case.349 In effect, a spurious plan's relevancy is based upon the sole
proscribed theory-past crimes evince an inference of character that the
defendant is more likely to have committed the present crime because he
committed bad acts in the past. In Dee, his identity was not an issue; the only
issue was whether he committed the alleged acts.
2. Judge Thomas's Concurrence
Judge Thomas's signature modus operandi/corroboration approach is an
attempt to expand the present law of evidence and is not wise. This particular
theory of relevancy is discussed by Professor Imwinkelreid.350 The initial
problem with the corroboration approach involves the nature of corroboration
in general. "Corroborating evidence is merely evidence that confirms other
evidence of fact.""' When a party is forced to specify which fact the
evidence is used to corroborate, the offering party is usually forced into
admitting that the evidence is used to show the propensity of the defendant to
commit similar acts. Corroboration's foundation of relevancy is character and
its inference of action in conformity therewith." 2 This theory of relevancy
is the only one directly proscribed by the applicable rules.353 In addition,
a prosecution based upon propensity or status of an individual may have
constitutional problems." 4
Judge Thomas acknowledged that his new category of evidence had this
problem, but he believed that through his five factor analysis the prejudicial
348. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
common plan or scheme exception.
349. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of spurious
plan versus true plan and common scheme cases.
350. See IMWnKLEREID, supra note 6, § 6:05.
351. Id
352. Id.
353. See supra notes 36-45, 50-51, and accompanying text for a discussion of the
underlying theory of Rule 404(b) and the inclusionary approach.
354. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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effect would be outweighed by its probative value."' 5  This assertion
assumes that identity and corroboration evidence are used in the same way.
True identity cases assume a crime has been committed but the
identification of the perpetrator is at issue.356 In corroboration cases, the
evidence of the prior crime is used to prove that the alleged event oc-
curred.37 The defendant's previous touching of the breasts of his former
patients has "very little to do with whether the defendant chose on this
occasion to [rape and sodomize the victim]. 35 8 The presumption that the
defendant acted upon his free will makes evidence regarding past conduct
irrelevant. 59
An illustration of how corroboration evidence is used by the factfmder
was penned by Chief Judge Robertson in his concurrence in Bernard."6
The ultimate conclusion of guilt based upon the testimony of the former
patients follows a path like this: 1) The four patients said that Sladek initiated
illegal sexual contact with them; 2) therefore, he did touch them; 3) therefore,
he is a pervert who abuses his position to satisfy his sexual desires; 4) if he
did this type of crime in the past he will most likely do it again; 5) therefore,
it is reasonable to conclude that Sladek did do it again; and 6) thus, what the
victim said must be true.36' Suddenly, Sladek is on trial for five crimes
instead of only one.
, This is judicial activism at its worst. The legislature adopts the rules and
has specifically excluded only one theory of relevancy when evaluating prior
misconduct.362 It is this sole restriction Judge Thomas sought to abrogate
in Bernard. If corroboration is to be an accepted exception in Missouri then
it could swallow the substance of the uncharged misconduct evidence rule.363
355. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317 (Thomas, J., concurring).
356. See supra notes 259-264.
357. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 25-27 (Thomas, J., concurring).
358. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317-18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
359. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 25-27 (Thomas, J., concurring).
360. Id, at 23-24 (Robertson, C.J., concurring).
361. Id. at 24.
362. The statutory construction theory of exclusion mandates this interpretation.
See, e.g., State ex rel County of St. Charles v. Mehan, 854 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993).
363. See Peter Fallon & Ruport Bursell, Similar Fact Evidence and Corrobora-
tion, 1978 CRIM. L. REv. 188-95.
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3. The Bernard Case
The difference between the majority in Bernard and the concurrences by
Chief Judge Robertson and Judge Thomas is a matter of degree2' Both
sides agree that the law of Lachterman and the cases that directly preceded its
adoption were too liberal and were headed down a dangerous path, a path that
threatened the genuine fairness a defendant is entitled to in court. "In a very
real sense defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury."365
This statement by Judge Cardozo encapsulates the fundamental problem with
the majority's new exception. The American judicial system places individu-
als on trial for specific acts. Defendants are not placed in front of the jury to
defend their entire life; rather, they must counter the allegation that has
brought them into court. One's character, no matter how flawed, is not on
trial. Only one question is before the judge and jury: "Did the defendant at
the time in question commit this/these particular act(s) that the legislature
made illegal?"
The majority in Bernard recognized the importance of this precept.
Therefore, they halted the trend Missouri courts were taking with the common
scheme or plan exception by adopting the new exception-signature modus
operandi/corroboration. However, with all the good intentions and built-in
safeguards in the test, the majority still failed to either recognize or adequately
guard against the inherent flaw in the modus operandi/corroboration evidence.
The problem is simple-the relevance of the new exception is based entirely
upon the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime. This theory of
relevancy is barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the corresponding
Missouri rule. For this reason alone, the Bernard exception should be
discarded.
If the Missouri Supreme Court is unwilling to retract this unprincipled
new exception, it will have to do a much better job policing the way in which
the courts are applying the exception. The split between the Eastern and
Western Districts is an exemplification of how this exception can expand
quickly if it is unchecked. Less than two months after Bernard was decided,
these two districts were applying greatly different standards under the same
test.3" The danger that Judge Thomas initially warned about in Sladek, that
the exception would become a slippery slope and the general rule of exclusion
would gradually disappear, 7 has already begun. It is the nature of this
exception to expand in application over time. Another problem has been the
364. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
365. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
366. See supra notes 269-339 for a discussion of the split between the districts
in their early application of the Bernard exception.
367. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 317 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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cases in which the exception has been applied. The sexual abuse of minors
arouses so much rage in society's eyes that the whole system can (and will)
get caught up in the fever to punish those it can. Logic and law get thrown
out in a hellfire of hate and disgust. The only practical cure is a total
abrogation of the corroboration exception.
Chief Judge Robertson's and Judge Thomas's concurrences in Bernard
argue for preservation of judicial integrity.368 They believe that the law
should retract from Lachterman past Bernard to the traditional approach
toward common plan or scheme. 69 This will allow Missouri courts to be
consistent in their handling of prior misconduct evidence. Most importantly,
it will do away with the unprincipled ability of the jury to reach a conviction
by reasoning through the defendant's propensities.
BRADLEY D. KuHLMAN
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